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1. Introduction 
The roots of socionics stretch back to the late seventies and early eighties when com-
puter scientists on the lookout for new methods and techniques for distributed and co-
ordinated problem-solving began to take an interest in social metaphors and human 
society. In the course of their explorations they made contact with some sociologists, 
struck up a dialogue and soon found themselves, to their astonishment, involved in un-
expected and strange avenues of research (Strübing 1998) into an unknown territory 
outside the confines of what Th.S.Kuhn used to call the normal sciences.2 Some years 
later they brought out a “white paper” on coordinated problem-solving in socio-
computational systems showing the need for further research and bearing the ominous 
title “The Unnamable” (Bendifallah et al. 1988). We have called this area of research, 
which was indeed then nameless, “socionics” (Malsch et al. 1996, Malsch 1997, 
Malsch 1998a, Müller et al. 1998).  
Socionics is a new field of research, a kind of tertium quid between sociology and 
distributed artificial intelligence (DAI). Using an approach similar to that adopted by 
bionics in which biological phenomena serve as a source of inspiration for new tech-
nologies, socionics seeks to address the question how to exploit models from the social 
world for the development of intelligent computer technologies, specifically multiagent 
systems (MAS). To discover the borderland between sociology and DAI means to pur-
sue the following questions: In what exactly do the characteristics of modern society 
consist; what makes social systems so resilient, adaptable and innovative; how may 
these features of modern society be translated into intelligent computer technologies; 
and what is the impact of sociology-based technologies on society? This set of ques-
tions has very much in common, but is by no means identical, with DAI research or 
with DAI-based social simulation. Instead, socionics is essentially addressed to the 
conceptual apparatus by which sociologists seek to observe, describe and explain 
modern society and from here - and only from here - it tries to build the bridge to the 
multiagent systems of DAI. It is an invitation to an unusual Gedankenexperiment 
where sociologists are requested to read multiagent technology as though it were a so-
ciological text (Woolgar 1991),3 where computer scientists are asked to read socio-
                                                                          
2
 Les Gasser, one of the co-authors of the „white paper“, characterized the three roots of the new 
research field as follows: „By the early 1980s existing DAI research had shown that the concept 
of coordinated problem solving was feasible and interesting. During the same period, a number of 
critical studies had emerged that began to seriously investigate the micro- and mid-level social as-
pects of computing in organizations. Concurrently, technologies for computer supported coopera-
tive work began to appear. It was clear to some groups of researchers that an important set of re-
lated issues was beginning to appear. These concerned the prescriptive and theoretical aspects of 
intelligent problem solving in aggregates (from DAI and concurrent computing) and the descrip-
tive, analytical and practical aspects of systems that involved people and machines working to-
gether with flexible dynamic divisions of labor.“ (Gasser/Briot 1992: 89) 
3
 Instead of reading „technology as object“, Woolgar has suggested to read „technology as text“. 
He argues „that the textuality of technologies and the textuality of argument is essentially similar 
...that all versions (descriptions, accounts) of technology be granted no greater authority than any 
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logical theory as though it were a technological design and and where both groups are 
required to familiarize themselves with the paradox of agent societies „out of control“.  
Thus, three different tenets are writ large on the agenda: (1) The first concerns the 
use of computer models in sociological theorizing and deals with the constitution of 
social order and the dynamics of social transformation. Here the claims of socionics 
must be substantiated in the arena of „sociological reference“. (2) The second – the 
lynchpin of the socionics research enterprise - is concerned with the development of 
new techniques and methods in DAI and investigates the role of sociological founda-
tions in the construction of large-scale multiagent systems. Here the rules of the game 
are the criteria of „computational reference“. (3) The third examines the social impact 
of hybrid artificial societies composed of both human beings and technical agents – 
with possibly far-reaching consequences for our own human self-image and our very 
existence as social beings. And here socionics must assert itself against standards of 
„praxis reference“.4 The central issue, however, is whether and how socionics will be 
capable of transforming sociological theories, and not just social metaphors or naive 
theories of sociality, into new technological potentials. 
Last no least a note of caution must be made to the reader: What follows are pro-
grammatic reflections from a sociological perspective rather than research results con-
firmed by both disciplines; many questions are raised but remain unanswered; and 
where a more elaborated argumentation should be expected often only a rough outline 
or a tentative explication is given; and, of course, the persepective on socionics given 
in this paper is not the only possible one. However, introducing an unusual topic justi-
fies a programmatic presentation of the basic ideas and the general scope of the new 
research enterprise. 
2. DAI and Sociology 
2.1 A difficult partnership 
What this paper is not concerned with is a conventional exchange of methods and tools 
between computer science and sociology that does not touch on the central tenets of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
other outcome of textual production and interpretation. This includes our own texts, in which we 
as analysts conventionally privilege our own status vis-à-vis the relativized status of the texts of 
others.“ (Woolgar 1991: 39ff) What we try to do with the soconics program seems to look like an 
operationalisation (multiagent systems as sociological text) and a rotation (sociological text as 
construction plan for multiagent systems) of Woolgar’s original suggestion. 
4
 The analogous triangulation for classic AI would be „cognitive reference“, „computational refer-
ence“ and „praxis reference“. The more current dual distinction between cognitive (basic or 
„strong“) AI and engineering (applied) AI appears to be less powerful - although it has helped to 
clarify earlier controversies about „what computers can or can’t do“ from the days of Dreyfus, 
McCarthy, Minsky, Searle, Simon etc. - because the concept of engineering AI is frequently mis-
used to suggest that running („computational“) systems are useful („practical“) systems. Why 
computational successes often turn out to be practical failures has been shown by empirical case 
studies of expert systems (Malsch et al. 1993). 
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the two disciplines. It is much more interesting to examine how interdisciplinary cross-
fertilization is achieved by producing cognitive dissonance and questioning respective 
basic assumptions. This is by no means to belittle the importance of conventional me-
thod transfer. On the contrary: empirical sociological research does well to plunder the 
methodological stock amassed by AI and exploit it in the furtherance of its own re-
search goals. Despite the lamentably low standards of computer literacy still prevalent 
among sociologists, remarkable work has already been done in this area, and there are 
indications to suggest that we are dealing with something like a success story (Bain-
bridge et al. 1994; Carley 1996). Even so, a note of caution should be sounded since, 
like true love, the course of AI in empirical sociology never did run smoothly. We only 
need recall the fate of a knowledge-based system for attitudinal research in social sci-
ences launched in the early eighties with the exaggerated claim typical of that period 
that it could replace a human interviewer (Baurmann/Mans 1984). Today it seems 
more promising to apply AI based methods to text analysis, sociometrical network 
analysis and statistical analysis of mass data (Hummon/Carley 1993, Chateauray-
naud/Charriau 1992, Teil 1991). If used to reinforce the methodology of empirical so-
cial research, AI has a valuable contribution to make and sociologists should give it the 
same amount of attention and respect that they pay to statistics or to ethnographical 
methods.  
Inversely, AI can profit from sociology by applying survey methods used in empiri-
cal social research to the design of expert systems. Although they would not serve to 
completely eliminate the notorious “bottleneck” of knowledge-acquisition, i.e. the 
problem of how to get the knowledge out of the expert’s head and into the system’s 
knowledge base, such social scientific methods would allow expert knowledge to be 
collated more reliably and to be structured more appropriately (Collins 1990, Forsythe 
1993). As we gather from the proceedings of knowledge-acquisition conferences, 
computer scientists in this area have an open ear for methodological prompts and sug-
gestions coming from empirical social research. Whether they act on all this good ad-
vice is of course a very different question. In the day to day business of developing 
intelligent application systems, most of it perishes by the wayside which just goes to 
show that the methods employed in social sciences are not recipes from a cookbook. 
In principle they are just as easy to learn as the methods of AI – but they are certainly 
not trivial. Applying them intelligently requires years of practical experience and a 
deep knowledge of the science from which they emanate. For better or worse, the me-
thods of empirical social research always come complete with a hinterland of scientific 
concepts. The non-specialist “user” who is not aware of this may get more than he has 
bargained for and can be put off for good. Disillusionment is in store for the naive 
knowledge engineer who wishes to collate expert knowledge using empirical methods 
from the social sciences just as disappointment awaits the dilettante sociologist striking 
out to build a knowledge-based expert system on his own without bothering to ask a 
knowledge engineer for help because he has a „user-friendly“ software tool at hand.  
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This much should be clear: Under the harmless surface of method transfer lurk dan-
gers of contradiction and controversy which must be addressed and resolved if we are 
to take socionics seriously. On the one hand there is an inherent contradiction between 
the theoretical claims and technological achievements of AI research and, on the other, 
there is a latent controversy between cognitive AI and social DAI that might eventually 
culminate in a change of paradigm from cognition to communication. Reducing the 
(D)AI phenomenon to “computer aided” empirical social research, and restricting so-
ciological curiosity to conventional methodological questions, fades out these contra-
dictions and „invisibilizes“ the deep techtonic tensions that give birth to a new field of 
research and to a new epistemic praxis. In order to fully comprehend socionics we 
need „triangulation“ or a research program that allows us to combine the three differ-
ent perspectives of sociological, computational and praxis reference. 
2.2 DAI’s „problem of society construction“ 
Classic AI takes the human mind or the human brain as the locus in which intelligent 
problem-solving takes place, and accordingly seeks the technological equivalents of 
the cognitive skills of a single human being. DAI, however, proceeds from the assump-
tion that complex problems can only be solved by the cooperation of many autono-
mously acting units, and thus is concerned with making intelligent programs cooperate 
with one another. This objective is most clearly apparent in the domain of multiagent 
systems. Multiagent systems reproduce the coordinated behavior of a number of artifi-
cial agents - software programs, endowed with autonomously controlled behavior pat-
terns which can coordinate their actions with those of other agents with a view to solv-
ing an overarching problem. However, even if DAI makes use here of models of real 
social systems, its primary concern is not to investigate what makes human societies 
tick but rather to find general, computable principles which will allow it to overcome 
the technical restrictions imposed by centralized control architectures.  
Even a cursory glance at the social world provides ample justification for such an 
approach. There is no doubt that human society disposes of a first-class stock of re-
sources for distributed software programs and decentralized computer networks and 
that it would be of particular interest to develop new algorithms for massive parallel 
computing and complex network architectures. Despite their uncontrollability and 
autonomy, social systems are endowed with a high degree of resilience and fault-
tolerance, as the computer jargon would have it. Unlike human individuals, biological 
populations or ecological systems, modern society has neither unchanging environ-
mental boundaries nor a mechanism for natural equilibrium and stability. This makes 
society appear fast and slow at the same time, endowed equally with extreme versatil-
ity and ultra stability. Moreover, modern society seems to command an enormous 
range of capabilities for self repair and reflexive adaptivity. It is these characteristics 
which appear to contain the material out of which the self evolving computer networks 
of a globalized communication infrastructure will be built.  
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The “core” problem that DAI research is trying to resolve does not derive from an 
all encompassing vision of an artificial sociality nor is it necessarily geared to socio-
logical concepts. It has rather to do with one of those features typical for classic AI 
which Carl Hewitt called the problem of „logical indeterminacy“ (Hewitt 1977): What 
would happen, he asked, when two “microtheories”, both equally internally consistent 
and thus in full accord with deductive logic, lead to contrary results? In logical terms 
this problem is unsolvable; as Hewitt showed, it can only be settled by recourse to 
“negotiation”. This is why “negotiation” was one of the first social metaphors to gain 
general recognition in DAI (Davis/Smith 1983). The main thrust of DAI research, then, 
is directed towards overcoming the limits of individual machine intelligence by making 
use of distributed and coordinated problem-solving techniques. Directed towards de-
veloping programs for highly complex knowledge domains, it is based on the princi-
ples of negotiating conflict and managing dissent in an intelligent way. Since such 
principles cannot be invented merely by „computational introspection“ alone, it is at 
this juncture that sociology can step in. Indeed, the DAI community has always looked 
beyond the confines of computer science to gain new impulses from the organizational 
and social sciences at work on similar issues. Thus, in its own view, DAI not only has 
a strong vested interest in interdisciplinary discourse but is also dedicated to the inves-
tigation of social interaction and social systems. This twofold intent is underscored in 
many papers and reports published by the discipline and in particular by the two 
documentations edited by Bond/Gasser and Huhns/Singh (Bond/Gasser 1988, 
Huhns/Singh 1998).  
Nevertheless, there are frictions between an interdisciplinary research enterprise in-
terested in explaining phenomena of emergent cooperation and the present level of 
technical development in viable multiagent systems. Within the DAI community they 
take the form of a play-off between two different sets of research interests. On the one 
hand, DAI is interested in understanding the social nature of cooperation between 
autonomous actors by means of programming multiagent systems as a technological 
end in itself. In this spirit it hold out the offer of a partnership to sociology, but even 
while doing so, it cannot forget its role as a rival and competitor. On the other hand, 
the concerns of DAI as an engineering science are centered on the development of new 
distributed software programs that make good the limitations of sequential processing 
and enable the exploitation of new software programs to tap the potential of a new 
generation of massive parallel computing. There is a general consensus in the DAI 
community that both strands belong together and that there are strong bonds binding 
theoretical objectives and engineering science goals. And there is also wide agreement 
that, with respect to these twin objectives, the DAI community is up against an unre-
solved “problem of society construction“ (Müller 1993) and that the concepts fur-
nished by classic AI so far are neither sufficient to deal with the foundational problems 
of intelligent cooperation nor to develop innovative mechanisms on which performa-
tive distributed systems may be built. Thus the issues of how to find a solution for the 
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“problem of society construction” and how to employ everyday social metaphors or 
sociological concepts to the task in hand, decidedly hang in the wind.  
2.3 Social metaphors in DAI 
A glance back at the beginnings of DAI will make the relevance of these questions ap-
parent. At that time one of the pioneers of DAI, Carl Hewitt, in his groundbreaking 
work on “patterns of passing messages” (Hewitt 1977)5 drew on the social psychology 
of G.H. Mead to propose both defining the meaning of a message by the reaction it 
occasioned in the addressee and constructing technological AI systems as distributed 
and parallel systems patterned on the model of a community of scientists who all enjoy 
equal rights. Published as the “scientific community metaphor” (Kornfeld/Hewitt 
1981), his proposal has now become a scientific by-word and heralded the advent of 
social metaphors in DAI literature. Since then social metaphors in DAI have become 
inseparable from the idea of overcoming the limitations of the “closed world assump-
tion” and the “microtheories” of classic AI by turning to “social cooperation” and 
“open systems” (Agha 1986, Hewitt 1986). It is, however, also noteworthy that social 
metaphors have made an impact in other branches of AI, particularly with regard to 
connectionism and, more recently, to Artificial Life research. In this respect, inspired 
by the fresh winds of the connectionist ideas which were then blowing new life into the 
debate, in his “Society of Mind”, Minsky advocated conceiving intelligence as a phe-
nomenon that resulted from the interconnectedness of a host of subintelligent elements 
(Minsky 1986). At the same time a research group headed by Holland succeeded in 
modeling social worlds by taking a quite different track: by researching the induction 
problem and developing intelligent inductive models through which the discovery of 
natural scientific laws could be simulated (Holland et al. 1987).  
All this research has colored work in the multiagent systems domain and led to a 
vastly expanded use of social metaphors during the 1990s. Yet although we have given 
some indication of their impact, the basic question regarding the precise nature of DAI 
interest in social metaphors like “scientific community”, “negotiation”, „contract“, 
“role expectation” etc. still remains unanswered. Social metaphors are interrogated in 
                                                                          
5
 It is noteworthy that the interesting point of Hewitt’s and Agha’s „actors“- and „open systems“-
approach is „patterns of message passing“ and not just sending messages. Recently, Agha has 
made this point very clear again: „Open systems are reconfigurable and extensible: they may allow 
components to be dynamically replaced and components to be connected with new components 
while they are still executing. Complex interaction patterns arise between different components of 
an open system. Our contention is that to simplify the task of implementing open systems in the 
real world, we must be able to abstract different patterns of interaction between components. On 
the other hand, models of concurrency are generally based on a rather low-level execution model - 
namely message passing as the mechanism to support interaction between components. Unfortu-
nately, programming using only message passing is somewhat worse than programming in assem-
bler: sending a message is not only a jump, it may spawn concurrent activity! The goal of our re-
search is to find a set of abstractions which enable interaction patterns between concurrent com-
ponents to be represented by modular and reusable code.“ (Agha 1997: 2) 
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order to find useful social laws for software development (Shoham/Tennenholtz 1992). 
With its manifold interactional and organizational systems, society represents a vast 
pool of inspirational potential for the development of concurrent algorithms and dis-
tributed computation such as will be used in future multimedia applied software in the 
Internet and the World Wide Web. This is why the economic potential of multiagent 
technology cannot be estimated too highly. Human society seems to dispose of some 
of the characteristics that are needed for the global communication networks of the 
future, and this is what makes it so interesting and attractive for a technological under-
taking such as multiagent systems. And this is why we may safely assert that present 
efforts to develop new technologies from an amalgam of social scientific and computer 
technological ideas are but a mere beginning. With its socially inspired multiagent 
technology, socionics seems to stand in a similar favorable position to other „com-
bined technologies“ such as bionics, Artificial Life, neuroinformatics and bioinformat-
ics. If this is correct, then we are likely to see a vast expansion of technologically mo-
tivated interest in social metaphors in the future.  
In the meantime, the readiness to learn from models of human societies and to con-
struct intelligent computer systems along patterns of social cooperation is not only ap-
parent in DAI, but throughout the whole of the AI community. Today the goals are set 
high: developing algorithms and architectures for “Artificial Social Systems” (Cas-
telfranchi/Werner 1994). Moreover, one of the most interesting facets is the increasing 
awareness in the DAI community that the development of multiagent systems involves 
key problems of sociological theory. Carl Hewitt and Les Gasser, in collaboration with 
sociologists like Gerson and Star, were among the first computer scientists to propose 
a cross-fertilization between the two disciplines and suggested to provide adequate 
computational conceptions for Sociology as well as to build DAI research on socio-
logical foundations (Gasser et al. 1989, Gasser 1991, Hewitt 1991). Although the so-
ciological turn of DAI was originally driven by technological considerations, it seems 
that we are ultimately faced by questions such as what are sociological foundations 
like and why is social theory appropriate to modern society, i.e. how is it capable of 
explaining and understanding its chosen object? Confronting these questions takes us 
far beyond the domain of engineering tasks. Indeed we seem to be dealing with a 
paradoxical “mish-mash” situation in which two disciplines - rivals and yet thoroughly 
interpenetrated with one another - struggle to assert their claims. 
At this juncture we might ask what possible profit sociological theory can expect 
from technical models of artificial sociality. Again, we find ourselves caught in a diffi-
culty: DAI semantics must be thoroughly imbued with sociology before they can make 
useful contributions to sociological theory and vice versa. In other words which disci-
pline underpins which? Dealing with unavoidable paradoxical and circular arguments 
seems to be part of the business of pursuing socionics and there is only one way out. 
We should begin to explore the socionics hypothesis by drawing a clear demarcation 
line between the respective claims of DAI and sociology, between computational and 
sociological reference. Thus the claim that sociological theories can be exploited tech-
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nologically must be discussed and asserted nowhere else but in the arena of the com-
puter sciences. Equally, the claim that it is possible to gain valuable sociological in-
sights through DAI-based social models must be put to the test nowhere else but in 
sociological discourse. 
3. Sociological Reference: On modeling sociological theories with 
MAS 
In what sense is it possible to model theories of modern society in the medium of mul-
tiagent technologies? Given that social phenomena can not be adequately represented 
by introspection, how can they be grasped by computer programs in a way that is both 
sociologically acceptable and non-trivial? From a standpoint of „sociological refer-
ence“ the priorities are clear: to gain a profound understanding of social phenomena in 
all their complexity, adequate semantic concepts and appropriate theoretical languages 
must first be developed before we can venture onto the computer model stage. Con-
versely, notions and ideas that stem from the direct experience of social life are inade-
quate tools for arriving at a deeper understanding of society. Experience gained by di-
rect involvement does not lend itself to unmediated conceptualization because it usu-
ally leads to insights which disguise rather than disclose social reality. Hence, when-
ever computer scientists set out to develop appropriate computer models of society 
they need to turn to the relevant specialist discipline and that is sociology.  
3.1 Neither classic AI nor Connectionism can support sociological the-
ory construction 
Interestingly enough, protosociological statements seem a kind of inevitable by-
product, whenever DAI concentrates on its regular work of extracting the engineering 
potential from distributed computer programs. Compared to other subdisciplines of 
computer science, DAI methods and techniques seem to lend themselves more easily 
to the construction of social theories. This will become clearer when we look at two of 
its key concepts - agent and cooperation. In order to do so we must first examine the 
difference between multiagent systems and „classic“ AI and „modern“ connectionism. 
With its two concepts of agency and cooperation, DAI has opened a path distinct both 
from that of the intelligence concept of traditional symbolic AI with its problem-
solving programs and from that taken by the intelligence concept employed by connec-
tionism with its neural networks. The former approach is informed by the cognitive 
thesis that intelligent action is to be ascribed to the single actor alone; it claims that 
intelligence operates according to the irreducible principles of logical symbol process-
ing. Connectionism, on the other hand views intelligence as the functionality of the 
brain and attempts to reproduce this in a subsymbolic way with the help of neural net-
works, whereas symbolic AI propounds a concept of intelligence that is human-like, 
couched in terms of the Cartesian „I“ as an epistemological concept of a human being 
living in splendid isolation from the rest of mankind. Or in Gasser’s words: „Current 
AI is largely a-social, and because of this, it has been inadequate in dealing with much 
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human behavior and many aspects of intelligence“ (Gasser 1991: 108). At least, in 
contrast to this, subsymbolic connectionist AI may boast of a rudimentary concept of 
social interaction with its specific formalisms modeled on the neurons and synapses of 
the human brain. However, it too must beat a retreat when it comes to modeling the 
social interaction of human actors endowed with their own wills and consciousness. 
Intelligence, here, is a product produced exclusively by stupid or blind components. 
Connectionism lacks a concept for autonomous action just as the symbolic processing 
approach lacks a concept of sociality.  
Both these approaches are inadequate for representing the cooperation of a number 
of intelligent autonomous actors in an appropriate manner and are unable to solve 
DAI’s “problem of society construction”. In marked contrast both to the Cartesian tra-
ditionalism of the famous “physical symbol systems hypothesis” and to the subsym-
bolic paradigm of neural networks, DAI’s multiagent systems are patterned on a 
protosociological frame of reference comprising of many intelligent actors whose 
scope for voluntaristic action raises substantial problems of cooperation and 
coordination. DAI has hit on a problem that leads straight to the heart of sociological 
theory making. Unlike other branches of computer science, multiagent technology has 
the potential to raise claims which sociology has to take seriously. If sociology does 
heed these claims and seeks to sound out the protosociological potential of DAI, then 
it must be prepared to examine the multiagent systems in a way that goes beyond the 
methodological dispute between qualitative and quantitative sociology. In order to 
explain why the time-honored sociological dispute about the (in)adequacy of formal 
models is a non-starter vis-à-vis the challenges posed by DAI, the standard arguments 
for and against the formalization of sociological explanations must inevitably be 
rehashed once more. When that is out of the way, then the discussion can turn to 
where the problems really are located and inquire why social simulation has failed to 
take an adequate grasp of the core problems of sociological theory.  
3.2 To formalize or not to formalize is not the question... 
To what extent can social worlds be represented on the computer and how far do com-
puter programs measure up to modern society as the object of social scientific investi-
gation? The case for formalization or model building is advocated by a minority in the 
sociological world who hold to a scientific ideal taken from the natural sciences. As all 
other kinds of scientific knowledge do, sociological theories work with abstractions 
and simplifications – even those theories which refrain from propositional statements 
and spread rich historical material before us. Even interpretative sociology must pro-
duce abstractions and ignore much of the phenomenological wealth of social reality, 
boiling it down to a set of highly condensed interpretations. From the point of view of 
a formal, „natural scientific“ sociology, it is a waste of time to discuss whether or not, 
and to what extent, abstractions are needed. Instead, stringent formal models must be 
developed and tested to see if their explanations measure up to the requirements of 
precision, simplicity and consistency or not. If we take all this for granted and leave 
aside the epistemological debates of the period, say, from Quine to Maturana, then we 
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may join forces with Bainbridge et al. who launched the following attack on all stripes 
of non-mathematical sociology: „The general public, to the extent that it has any opin-
ion about social theory at all, probably considers it to be mere ideology. So long as 
theories are rambling verbal mediations punctuated with dubious metaphors, there is 
little defense against this accusation. (Artificial Intelligence) and mathematical formal-
ism are compatible methods for stating theory precisely, connecting its concepts in rig-
orous intellectual structures, and identifying both hidden assumptions and unexpected 
consequences. Skillfully written simulation programs can be an excellent medium for 
communication of precise theoretical statements, so long as the intended audience has 
learned how to read programs.“ (Bainbridge et al. 1994: 431) 
However, simply replacing dubious metaphors with formal definitions does not meet 
the requirements for elaborating powerful, reflexive sociological theories. If we wish 
to gain new insights into, for instance, life styles and norms, role expectations and in-
dustrial conflict, institution-building and the transformation of values, then, according 
to the prevalent sociological view, it is not enough to be precise, simple and rigorous. 
We need recourse to highly complex theory architectures and open descriptive lan-
guages of the kind that sociology has developed in the hundred years of its history. 
Would they then allow us to dispense with the need for differential equations or logic 
programs? Although many interpretative sociologists have no compunctions about us-
ing computer programs to process their empirical data, they still remain skeptical about 
formal models. Their main objections are: (1) Social theories feed on richly textured 
descriptive languages and cannot be adequately presented as decontextualized formal-
isms; (2) Computer models contain an objectivist bias and are not suitable for grasping 
concepts of self reference and reflexivity inherent in modern human society; (3) Com-
puter programs are simplistic and therefore not capable of realistically simulating the 
complexity of real social worlds. Collins who, from the perspective of interpretative 
sociology, has conducted particularly exhaustive studies of AI and knowledge formal-
ization in expert systems, sums up these objections in a nutshell. In his view, modeli-
zation or formalization is possible only where society itself has created highly stan-
dardized and rationalized structures of social action like the abacus or the assembly 
line. In general, however, as he notes „...neither regular science nor machines can 
model social life.“ (Collins 1992: 730)6 
                                                                          
6
 The theoretical question of how computer programs could be used as a medium to address and 
explicate sociological problems in an interesting new way (‘sociological reference’) must be 
strictly separated from the practical issues of how to substitute (or reinforce) human society (or-
ganizations, institutions) with artificial social systems (‘praxis reference’). In his polemic against 
what he calls „models of social life“, Harry Collins obviously confounds these two aspects: „Leigh 
Star (1989) discovered in her collaborative work with computer scientists that sociological meta-
phors were adopted wholesale. Adopting a metaphor allows the difficult parts of the problem to 
be ignored while the terminology makes it seem as though social life is being encapsulated in pro-
grams. (...) Nigel Gilbert describes some work intended to model the growth of human societies 
using networked programs to model collections of individuals. (...) It seems unlikely that the 
computer instantiated ‘individuals’ in these programs bear much resemblance to members of soci-
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With the exception of some mathematical sociologists, Collins’ views would doubt-
less find broad agreement with most sociologists. In any case, among the more famous 
names shaping the course of contemporary sociology there is hardly anybody, with the 
exception perhaps of James Coleman, who is prepared to put in a good word for a 
mathematics- or algorithm-based modelization or formalization of social theory or who 
seriously expects substantial gains from such a move. And, with regard to Coleman’s 
theory of rational choice, it was not so much the mathematical form it was cast in that 
attracted attention as its conceptual semantics and theoretical architecture. We should 
not forget that the main point here is the semantic content of the theory, not the degree 
of its formalization. From this perspective, questions as to whether we should stick to 
the salutary path of „lean formalization“ or prefer „thick description“ are of secondary 
importance. Ultimately, the choice we are faced with is not that between rigid formal-
ism and tentative description, but rather that of selecting between a number of different 
conceptual frameworks tailored to respective goals of research. Thus the degree of 
formalism to be used should depend on the nature of the problems and themes being 
dealt with. 
3.3 ...but addressing Sociology’s key theory problems 
We should not be worrying whether abstraction and model building are activities 
which can or should be employed but should rather direct our attention to two key 
questions: first, can a model or a theory address sociology’s key theory problems in a 
promising new way; and second, is the model seriously debated by the sociological 
community and widely accepted as an interesting contribution to resolving these prob-
lems. This is to place high demands not only on the gains expected from abstraction, 
but in particular on the conceptual content of sociological theorizing. It is unacceptable 
to build multiagent systems using some kind of intuitively grounded protosociological 
concept and then proclaim them sociologically interesting models of artificial sociality 
just because they are neatly composed, rigorously structured and hence programmable. 
What we should rather be seeking to produce is theories that are grounded in central 
sociological issues and research questions. And we can only do this after a critical re-
construction of sociology’s substantive puzzles and paradoxes. This task must be con-
ducted before DAI can even think about providing “...the social sciences with concep-
tual and experimental tools, namely the capacity to model and make up in parallel, re-
active and cognitive systems, and the means to observe their interactions and emerging 
effects.” (Conte/Castelfranchi 1995: v) 
In order to be in a position to provide the social sciences with conceptual and ex-
perimental tools, DAI must first take on board the basic issues that have occupied re-
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
ety; it is more likely that they are rational abstractions of the sort used by economists and rational-
ist philosophers of science“ (Collins 1995: 293). However, „social life“ is no more „encapsulated“ 
in Star’s or Gilbert’s programs than it is encapsulated in a sociological text, of course, and neither 
of these programs bears any more resemblance to real groups of real human beings than Collins’ 
„core set“ of scientists in his own sociological texts. 
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search in sociology from its very origins onwards. These issues touch on the question 
of just what makes sociology so distinct from its sister disciplines, yet binds its numer-
ous currents within the framework of a permanent controversy. It is these basic prob-
lems which delineate the frame of reference within which computer-based social mod-
els must be validated and which lie at the heart of what we call „sociological refer-
ence“. With all due circumspection, the core set of basic issues in sociological theory 
may be summarized as four succinct questions: (1) How is social order possible in the 
face of vigorously autonomous human beings? (2) How are social phenomena at the 
microlevel interrelated with the macrolevel of society? (3) How can we understand the 
relationship between social action and social structure? (4) How can we explain the 
dynamics of social transformation and structural change? It is within the arena con-
comitant to these questions that computer-based tools of social simulation must find 
their bearings and prove their worth. If they do so, then the other dispute about formal 
or interpretive explanations will lose much of its edge. If we accept that the construc-
tion of formal explanatory models can be as legitimate and revelatory as rich empirical 
descriptions or critical Zeitdiagnoses, then we are free at last to turn to the really im-
portant questions, namely how formal models in general or agent-based social simula-
tion in particular can contribute to resolving the „core set problems“ addressed by the 
micro-macro link and the emergence and transformation of social structure. 
3.3.1 The micro-macro-problem: relating social agency and social structure 
As we have already noted, there are different ways of posing the core set problems and 
each way elicits a different set of answers. Can social structures be understood as ag-
gregates of social actions (Garfinkel); or is the reverse true and individual action 
largely determined by irreducible social structures (Durkheim); or do agency and struc-
ture stand in a complimentary relationship, that structures both constrain and enable 
social action (Giddens)? With regard to sociological theory construction, these ques-
tions are of key import for research and model building in artificial sociality. More-
over, they are also of major importance for DAI in that they indicate how agent-based 
(e.g. Cohen/Levesque, Wooldridge) or structure-based approaches (e.g. Hewitt, Sho-
ham) may be integrated on the conceptual level. Here we find proposals complemen-
tary to those discussed in sociology, with the spectrum ranging from the microtheoreti-
cal approaches adopted by interpretative sociologists like Goffman and Garfinkel or 
game theorists like Homans and Coleman, over praxis theorists like Giddens and 
Habermas to systems theorists like Parsons and Luhmann. Consequently, each answer 
to the vexed questions of the nature of modern society furnishes the basis for the de-
velopment of highly disparate formal models of artificial sociality. What is of interest 
to sociology here is that multiagent systems open new avenues for a methodologically 
controlled comparison of theories via computer simulation.  
So far computer programs of social macro simulation have been unable to deliver 
such a comparison. The reason for this is not that they are computer programs but that 
they have been built to ignore the core set problems of sociological theory. Firmly 
rooted in the objectivist tradition of a „parameter-sociology“, this kind of social simu-
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lation confines itself to describing dependency relations between variables whilst ig-
noring the really difficult questions our discipline must address. Of modest ambition, 
parameter-sociologists content themselves with being precise, simple, consistent, rig-
orous and so on. Rather than addressing the difficult questions of agency and social 
structure, traditional macro simulation deals with relationships between macro vari-
ables like age, income, gender, religious affiliation, political preference etc., using 
computer simulations to test the effects of parametric manipulation. The results are not 
uninteresting, of course, but there is no doubt that computer simulation, as practiced by 
conventional parameter-sociology, is not very inventive and has so far fallen miserably 
short of explaining sociology’s basic puzzles. In fact, it is impervious to the impact of 
individual or collective action on social structures just as it cannot explain how struc-
tural influences impinge on individual action.  
In marked contrast, micro simulations (Manhart 1995) are a great deal more promis-
ing from a sociological „core set“ standpoint. Informed by the theory of rational choice 
imported from micro economics, they draw on the assumption that human individuals 
in social contexts act strategically with a view to their own best interests. Thus indi-
vidual behavior may be described by general rules of rational action which are con-
sciously followed by individuals to achieve particular goals. Micro simulation is pat-
terned on the theorem of methodological individualism in which all statements about 
social affairs may be traced back to statements about individuals. The interesting point 
here is that the theory of rational choice claims to be able to demonstrate how general 
social phenomena such as social norms or the restratification of demographic struc-
tures emerge from rational action. For instance, it claims to show, theoretically and via 
simulations programs, how, under the influence of individual neighborhood prefer-
ences, ethnically mixed communities or city districts gradually evolve into ethnically 
homogeneous areas. Admittedly, what this particular type of micro sociology cannot 
show is how such preferences arise, since it must systematically fade out the impact 
the macro level of society has on individual behavior (Blau 1987). What follows from 
this is that „the systematic use of computer programs in sociological research has to be 
combined with the question of which way sociological theory can and must be changed 
in accordance with the new possibilities simulations offer for sociological research. 
‘Computational sociologists’... seldom give answers to this question; they are mostly 
content if and when they are able to show that they can capture some special social 
processes within their simulation programs... as partisans of rational choice theory... 
That is of course something not to be underestimated, but it is not enough“ (Klüver 
1998: 15f).7 
                                                                          
7
 This is neither to deny that rational choice (RC) and game theory are hegemonial in economics 
nor to ignore the fact that game theory has been, and still is, rather influential in DAI (e.g. coaliti-
on systems). However, here we are not dealing with the social sciences in general but with socio-
logy. And, as one of the anonymous reviewers of this paper has remarked, „modeling the interac-
tionist version of commitment is somewhat more tricky than an interest based concept of indivi-
dual action. That is exactly the reason why RC-theories are more ,sexy‘ to most DAI researchers 
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3.3.2 Crossing the micro-macro-bridge 
To overcome the avowed limitations of methodological individualism we must cast 
around for other explanatory concepts. And there is no lack of candidates in this field. 
Among others, there are at least two outstanding theories which need to be examined: 
Gidden’s theory of structuration and Luhmann’s theory of autopoietic systems. This is 
not the place to follow up these theories, but what can be shown is that, after the pio-
neering work of Hewitt and Gasser, the micro-macro link is increasingly regarded as a 
crucial issue of research, both in DAI and social simulation. Cristiano Castelfranchi 
and Rosaria Conte, for instance, underline the need for closing the conceptual gap be-
tween micro and macro approaches (Conte/Castelfranchi 1995).8 In their view, DAI 
with its multiagent technologies will enable sociology to redesign the use of algo-
rithmic models and simulation techniques. And their view finds strong support in other 
authors: Multiagent systems “seem more able to ‘mirror’ societies and groups of peo-
ple than their alternatives” (Doran/Gilbert 1994: 10), i.e. conventional mathematical 
simulation; and they offer a much more promising alternative to traditional simulation 
because they promise to “cross the micro-macro bridge” (Drogoul/Ferber 1994: 6). 
With multiagent systems, for the first time a simulation technique seems to be available 
that allows both to model the structural characteristics of social systems as the emerg-
ing result of social interaction and to model social action as shaped by social struc-
tures. This should allow to represent social phenomena of far greater complexity than 
was possible with traditional models and to explore a wide range of sociological con-
cepts through simulation without prejudicing prior theoretical decisions regarding the 
micro-macro link. In fact, conference publications in social and organizational simula-
tion over the last few years (edited by Gilbert/Doran 1994, Gilbert/Conte 1995, Carley 
1996, Troitzsch et al. 1996, Ahrweiler/Gilbert 1998, Prietula/Carley/Gasser 1998) give 
cause for some optimism, although most of the contributing authors do not seem to be 
aware of, or interested in addressing, the gap between social simulation and sociologi-
cal theory. 
3.4 Methodological recommendations  
Having said this, we should recall that if we wish to make full use of the sociologically 
interesting potential of multiagent systems, we must first cast off the blinkers imposed 
by conventional parameter sociology and immerse ourselves in the techniques of the-
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
than other approaches.“ Although I am not inclined to disagree, I should point out to recent deve-
lopments in RC-based sociological approaches which seem to be much more sophisticated than 
what is generally presented by mainstram economics 
8
 Referring to the volume of sociological essays edited by Alexander et al. (1987), they note: “AI is 
required in the treatment of the well-known problem of the micro-macro link. Only by represent-
ing (either formally or experimentally) agents’ internal mechanisms, interactions and global func-
tions can we have a chance to solve this problem in a non-speculative way. On the other hand, in 
order for AI to provide a significant contribution, and deal with issues of social theory in a non-
naive way, it must be able to handle social science’s typical puzzles and relevant data, and closely 
approach existing theories.” (Conte/Castelfranchi 1995: vi) 
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ory construction used by modern sociological theories. What we need to do is to push 
the claims of sociology as an intellectual discipline into multiagent systems research 
and to reformulate our demands from the perspective of the core set of our own unre-
solved theory questions. Constructing artificial social systems to serve genuine socio-
logical ends confronts us with a problem of bilateral translation: translating sociologi-
cal theory into multiagent models and re-translating these models back into the dis-
course of sociology.  
3.4.1 „Socionic Ethnography“ between curiosity and resistance 
First, in taking one or two of the major approaches9 to the „core set“ problems as a 
point of departure, we should explore how to translate them into formal models with-
out loss of authenticity, how to prevent them from being trivialized, and how to bring 
their innate paradoxes and puzzles into sharper focus. And in translating sociological 
concepts, every single step at formalization should be subject to carefully documented 
critique. What is needed here is a kind of “socionic ethnography”10 that elucidates the 
prospects and pitfalls of formal modelization as an epistemic practice balanced be-
tween sociological resistance and curiosity, and that encourages creative deviance as 
well as subjecting socionic translations to hostile interrogation. This does not mean 
that DAI engineers are expected to translate sociological concepts into design while 
sociologists are expected to resist “bad” translations of their concepts. To prevent the 
two communities from working along two parallel tracks and to insure cross-
fertilization we need to organize “tandem projects” of computer scientists and sociolo-
gists cooperating as partners and making use of a certain amount of job rotation. In 
doing so we are hopefully able to assert both, sociological curiosity in computational 
modeling and resistance against succumbing to the temptations of a “computability 
light”. And then perhaps we will find that socionic explorations can indeed create 
valuable new sociological insights.  
3.4.2 Retranslating computational models into sociological debates 
Second, whether or not the sociological community accepts an unusual suggestion or 
theoretical proposal as a valuable new insight, has nothing to do with computer pro-
grams. Here, computability is not the benchmark of „validity“. In contrast to the con-
                                                                          
9
 To name but a few of those that have already been considered for socionic translations: Pierre 
Bourdieu (by Florian 1998), Anthony Giddens (by Rammert 1998, Conte/Castelfranchi 1995) and 
Niklas Luhmann (by Bachmann 1998, Ellrich/Funken 1998, Klüver 1998). 
10
 This term was coined after discussions with Holger Braun and Rolf Lührs. It seems to be quite in 
line with Woolgar’s „reflexivity project“ (cf. footnote 3) as well as with Amann and Hirschauer 
who, at least tentatively, suggest that sociological theory should be ethnographically explored as a 
distinctive cultural practice (Amann/Hirschauer 1997: 40). Nevertheless, unlike ethnographic 
studies, socionic translations do not necessarily have to „entertain a ‘parasitic’ relationship to so-
ciological theories - i.e. an expropriative, disloyal or even destructive one - ...because“, as the two 
authors would have it, „the self-structuration of the fields of research cross-cuts through any type 
of theoretical universalism“ (Amann/Hirschauer 37f, my translation, Th.M.), since we are ulti-
mately unable to distinguish between the „the field“ and „the author“.  
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ventions of conventional social simulation, the running program is not the ultimate goal 
of formal modelization as long as we are talking of sociological reference. The chal-
lenge is rather how to re-translate a socionic model or a program of artificial sociality 
into a plain sociological text that is able to speak and argue for itself and play a signifi-
cant role in the sociological debates on key theory problems. Because it has nothing 
else to offer to sociology but the text itself - since nothing else would be accepted by 
the community as a sociological achievement anyway - socionics must expose itself to 
and be able to withstand the rigors of critical scrutiny in a theory debate in which the 
only means it has to convince are those of its retranslated sociological arguments.  
4. Computational Reference: On reading sociological theory as tech-
nological design 
Is it possible to create a new generation of intelligent technologies imaged after mod-
ern human society? This question signals a switch-over from the problem of sociologi-
cal adequacy to the standpoint of computational performance. In order to examine the 
technological exploitability of social metaphors and sociological concepts without be-
ing troubled by the stormy debates on the proper sociological explanation of society, 
we must first rigorously leave “truth questions” of sociology aside. This alternation 
from „sociological reference“ to „computer scientific reference“ will then allow us to 
address the exciting question of the role of sociological theory in DAI as a technologi-
cal enterprise. In this perspective, the only valid criteria are those of computational 
performance: speed and runtime, algorithmic elegance and efficiency, modularity and 
maintainability. Nothing more in fact than the standard criteria of computer science, 
these are the criteria against which the innovations produced by sociologically inspired 
multiagent technology must ultimately be measured. Once we have turned from socio-
logical claims to those of computer science, the main questions that arise are whether 
software developed by DAI can compete with the procedures, methods and tools of 
other branches of computer science and whether imports from sociology can give them 
a cutting edge in competition. The very different question of whether computer scien-
tists working on multiagent systems can make a significant contribution to research 
into modern society is completely irrelevant in the context of computational reference.  
4.1 A different starting point: sociological theories instead of naive so-
cial metaphors 
Nonetheless we still need to raise the matter of sociological expertise. A glance back 
to the beginnings of distributed problem-solving (DPS) should make it apparent why 
we should do so. In its early work DPS was not so much concerned with developing 
multiagent systems as with technical engineering work that involved (1) decomposing 
highly complex problems into a set of simpler subproblems and (2) bringing together 
the partial solutions into a coherent global solution. This work gave rise to a whole 
bunch of questions regarding the temporal, objective and social dimensions of coop-
eration and coordination - problems of a type already familiar to the social sciences. 
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Thus the very nature of its own engineering problems was a powerful inducement for 
DAI to turn to sociology. Even so, the reception of the range of conceptual approaches 
employed in sociology has been largely a piecemeal affair. Usually, social terms in 
DAI are used as mere metaphors (Castelfranchi/Werner 1994: xiii). They draw on na-
ive and sometimes rather hazy notions about social phenomena and avoid burdening 
themselves with the weight of sociological concept formation. A systematic approach 
to sociological theorizing is more the exception than the rule. So the question that need 
to be raised here is what can be gained by using non-metaphoric sociological concepts, 
and what can DAI research learn from sociological theory? 
The most courageous and compelling position is without a doubt that taken up by 
Les Gasser who expects that recourse to sociology will have a decisive impact on DAI 
by furthering its advance as a technological undertaking. According to Gasser, the 
conceptual problems of cooperation and coordination, decentrality and openness, 
asynchronity and parallelity all require sociological answers which will not be found as 
long as there is a fixation on the naive idea of the single agent with predetermined mo-
tives, interests and intentions. As Gasser underlines: “The traditional set of analytical 
categories and implementation techniques used in AI does not include fundamentally 
social elements; the focus is on the individual actor as the locus of reasoning and 
knowledge and the individual proposition as the object of truth and knowing. (...) To 
make substantial theoretical progress, we must first begin to lay firm social founda-
tions for DAI research. (...) DAI systems, as they involve multiple agents, are social in 
character; there are properties of DAI systems which will not be derivable or repre-
sentable solely on the basis of properties of their component agents. We need to begin 
to think through and articulate the bases of knowledge and action for DAI in the light 
of their social character.” (Gasser 1991: 111f) This view draws on the thesis that soci-
ety is not composed of individuals, in fact quite the reverse: human individuals and 
their minds or mental states are socially constituted and develop from social interac-
tion. 
The same holds true for the category of „commitment“ which has grown popular in 
DAI and which Gasser believes can only be understood and implemented as a social 
character along the lines of Mead’s reciprocal role taking. As he comments „... the no-
tion of commitment is distributed because the agent of commitment is a distributed en-
tity“ (Gasser 1991: 113, comp. Castelfranchi 1995, Florian 1998). In his critique of the 
highly influential mentalistic approach to commitment forwarded by Cohen and 
Levesque, Gasser further contends that it is impossible to advance as far as social 
„webs of commitment“ whilst holding to an a-social concept of an agent and defining 
intention, in the sense of a mentalistic predetermined characteristic, as „choice with 
commitment“ (Cohen/Levesque 1990). Instead of this, he advocates a completely dif-
ferent approach: „AI research must set its foundations in ways that treat the existence 
and interaction of multiple actors as a fundamental category“ (Gasser 1991: 112). Only 
when the basic categories of individual action have been replaced by the basic catego-
ries of social interaction will it be possible to build a firm theoretical foundation for the 
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construction of multiagent systems. In pursuit of this goal, Gasser recommends that we 
reconceptualize the mundane ideas of the social that have been employed in DAI so far 
– in other words he advocates the replacement of pre-scientific social metaphors by 
sociological concepts.  
4.2 Scalability and dynamic adaptation: paradoxes of structuration 
and change 
To make this clearer, let us look at the software rationale on which the design of the 
multiagent systems of the future is based: scalability and dynamic adaptation. At the 
present stage of their development, multiagent systems are still characterized by relati-
vely simple, static models which require extensive modification before they can opera-
te in a global network of thousands of agents.11 Lesser cautiously seems to endorse the 
view that DAI is in need of a turn to sociology when he writes that agent societies 
„consisting of ... thousands of ... agents will need to be able to form and evolve higher 
order social structures ... to exploit collective efficiencies and to manage emerging 
situations. (...) The fundamental issue to be addressed ... is what are the basic func-
tions and interaction patterns necessary for an agent architecture to support the con-
struction of (adaptable) systems and to allow them to operate efficiently and robustly? 
The answer to this question will of necessity be speculative since there is no substan-
tial experience in building multi-agent systems of this anticipated scale and complex-
ity“ (Lesser 1998: 91). Indeed, one of the crucial engineering question still facing DAI 
research is how to build very large and highly dynamic artificial social systems which 
will be able to deal with the complex demands of real world applications and this in-
volves adaptive learning in and by multiagent systems in an environment like the inter-
net.12 Translated into sociological language, it corresponds to problems around the 
micro-macro link and the dynamics of social transformation. And for DAI with a so-
ciological perspective, this means that in its own technological self interest it will have 
to examine the theories on emergent social structures and social change far more close-
                                                                          
11
 Of course, other sociological approaches to DAI are possible, e.g social situatedness or embo-
diement. Such micro-approaches are not discussed in this paper because they are restricted to 
face-to-face interaction and co-presence of acquaintanted actors. However, if we assume that 
modern society largely relies on anonymous mechanisms of coordination rather than on personal 
contact and direct communication and that it is not based on kinship and neighbourhood, it is evi-
dent that socionics is less concerned with micro issues, unless it can be shown that these do in-
deed have a direct impact on macro social phenomena.   
12
 With regard to the internet, Rolf Lührs suggests to by-pass the problem of scalability: since pro-
gramming many thousands or millions of agents is unfeasible anyway, a more promising way to 
tackle the scalability problem might be to remove the load of coordination from interacting agents 
to the system-environment level (Lührs 1999). Accordingly, multiagent systems could either be 
re-described as social systems within a non-social environment (the internet as natural environ-
ment), or as social subsystems within human society (the internet as the overarching social sys-
tem). The system/environment-distinction, as introduced into sociology by Parsons and Luhmann, 
is not a ready made solution for DAI technology. However, in line with Hewitt’s open systems 
semantics (OSS) it might serve as an interesting research approach to DAI. 
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ly than it has done so far. Once again this brings us back to the core set of sociological 
theory problems which – even from a quite different perspective – show themselves to 
be the saddle point for an interdisciplinary research program in socionics.  
With regard to scalability, we will need to ascertain how communication structures 
are formed and stabilized by social action, thus enabling social systems of growing 
complexity which, in turn, provide powerful social mechanisms to coordinate and ag-
gregate growing numbers of individual actors. This could open the way to reformula-
ting „Open Information Systems Semantics“ or OISS (Hewitt 1991) from a sociologi-
cal perspective. If large-scale artificial societies are conceived as networks operating 
on the principles of parallelism and openness - i.e. on asynchronous activities of per-
manently fluctuating participants - a unified platform for networks composed both of 
human and technical actors is needed that serves, in sociological terms, as an instituti-
onal framework for conflict resolution. In Hewitt’s approach conflict resolution or 
problem solving is shaped by pre-defined semantics which are, so to speak, equivalent 
to a pre-existing social structure. But where is the structure and its semantics coming 
from? This question reveals the blind spot of pre-defined semantics which cannot show 
how social structures emerge from social interactions. OISS, in other words, cannot 
see that social structures are nothing else but routines of conflict resolution resulting 
from previously resolved problems or conflicts (Gasser 1991). However, any sociolo-
gically appropriate model of artificial sociality must be able to handle the „uncomputa-
tional“ paradox that its communication structures must have pre-existed before they 
can emerge and that they must emerge before they can come into existence. How can 
DAI learn from the way the paradox is treated by sociology? Of course, the difficult 
point here is not sociological appropriateness as such but rather decoding the sociolo-
gical paradox of structuration as a guideline for the construction of technological sca-
lability. In order for a social framework to be produced by communication or interac-
tion – or in technical terms: in order to develop a program that is able simultaneously 
to solve distributed problems by communication protocols and to generate communica-
tion protocols for distributed problem-solving – it would be necessary to pre-program 
an institutional framework that could itself shape the intentions, convictions and goals 
of the individual actors and, what is of equal importance - also do the whole in reverse! 
(Malsch 1998b)  
However, the translation of a sociological problem into an engineering question is 
but a starting point for further investigations. And more questions will arise: how is 
“personal” direct communication flanked with “impersonal” generalized media (Par-
sons) or capital resources (Bourdieu) of social exchange (e.g. power, money, exper-
tise, culture) and how are these resources reinforced in personal interaction 
(Malsch/Schulz-Schaeffer 1997)? Or, with regard to the inner dynamics of social re-
production, how do coherent global solutions emerge from incoherent local activities 
(Hewitt/Inman 1991: 1411); how are stable solutions possible in the face of conflict-
ing, concurrent, and asynchronous elementary operations? And why is this issue so 
crucial for DAI when a sociologist might laconically observe that modern society, far 
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from being imbued with total global coherence, can deal equally well with global inco-
herence and instability? To answer all these questions, sociological concepts of „time“ 
and “temporalization” (Luhmann 1984, Giddens 1984) need to be merged with those 
of DAI (Gasser et al. 1989: 55, Bond 1990: 22) and must be systematically translated 
into the language of multiagent learning (Weiß/Sen 1996, Weiß 1997).  
4.3 Methodological recommendations 
These few remarks must suffice here to point out the direction to be taken if concep-
tual foundations and design principles from sociology are to be established for the 
building of dynamic “large-scale open systems” (Hewitt 1986). This requires a joint 
research program between DAI and sociology that will not succumb to the deceptive 
limpidity of fashionable terms like “emergence” (Ellrich/Funken 1998) or blindly try to 
transfer sociological concepts on a “one to one basis” into computer models. Rather, 
we must prepare ourselves for a laborious process of transfer and translation between 
the two disciplines. For obvious reasons sociology does not in itself furnish any ready 
made solutions but rather provides a number of different starting points. But still the 
skeptic computer scientist may ask: I hear the message - but is it feasible anyway? And 
when can we expect technologically interesting results? The answer to the first ques-
tion is yes and, moreover, to the second question the answer is that its feasibility has 
alrady been proven. A striking example of successfully translating sociological con-
cepts into meanwhile generally exepted and widely applied technological mechanisms 
in DAI are acquaintances (as in Hewitt’s Actors) and modeling other agents (as in 
Gasser’s MACE). And, as Carley and Gasser just recently stated again, these ideas 
have „now become commonplace within MAS and DAI research; however, few re-
searchers recognize the link they are making to social theory“ (Carley/Gasser 1999: 
321).13  
However, before we can run systems of artificial sociality that open up realistic ap-
plication perspectives in the Internet, we have a long and thorny way to tread. And the 
next steps are faced with a problem of selection. If we glance through DAI publica-
tions we may be struck by the increasing number of paeans of praise wafted in the di-
rection of sociology. We can take this as evidence that researchers in socionics within 
the DAI community are now allowing themselves to be guided by a wide spectrum of 
different sociological theories and are no longer reliant solely on G.H. Mead and sym-
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 Another example of how new technological ideas are generated from social theory is furnished by 
Ishida, Gasser and Yokoo. They propose a multiagent system based on proven production sys-
tems and allowing for a novel mechanism of organizational self-design by flexibly adapting the 
number of active agents to the current stage of the problem solution (Ishida et al. 1992). On the 
one hand, here, it is obvious that the ideas of social closure and (re)opening which Gasser earlier 
took over from Dewey and Mead (Gasser et al. 1989) are at work once more. However, it is 
equally obvious that the program of organizational self-design would never have been written in 
the way it was without a creative switch – a break with the initial sociological concept. To expli-
cate the paradox of structuration mentioned above, such considerations need to be examined 
more closely. 
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bolic interactionism. Instead, we find a role concept that is reminiscent of Parsons 
(Werner 1989), whilst other approaches are informed by Luhmann’s concept of confi-
dence (Marsh 1994, Bachmann 1998) or Gidden’s theory of structuration 
(Conte/Castelfranchi 1995, Rammert 1998). While drawing a critical line between 
themselves and Gasser, Conte and Castelfranchi are correct to point out that sociology 
embraces highly disparate concepts of actors and action, and that in sociological dis-
course symbolic interactionism is but one out of many competitors (Castelfran-
chi/Conte 1996) even though it appears to enjoy a clear advantage so far, at least 
within the American DAI community (Strübing 1998). Furthermore, although Gasser 
explicitly refers to Mead, his own approach is not conditioned by Mead alone but also 
bears the imprint of Callon and Latour and their “actor-network” theory (Schulz-
Schaeffer 1998).14  
4.3.1 Evaluating technological potentials of different sociological theories 
However, the task here is not to select one candidate only and ignore, by fiat as it 
were, all the others. Intelligent selection from the range of theory offered by sociology 
involves both choosing at least two different approaches that bear on the problems of 
scalability and dynamic adaptability and evaluating their technological potential with 
respect to these problems.15 This is to qualify Gasser’s assertion - without sociological 
foundations no substantial progress in DAI – since it opens up a range of heuristic pos-
sibilities. In view of the sheer range of paradigms offered by sociology, we should 
limit our selection to some of the more interesting candidates. During their transforma-
tion into formal models of artificial sociality, these candidates must be subject to a sys-
tematic comparison both with regard to technological performance and sociological 
adequacy. To ensure a systematic evaluation of the technological potential of socio-
logical concepts, we must distinguish between „processes“ (the practical task of build-
ing computational models) and „results“ (the resulting computational models as run-
                                                                          
14
 For a more detailed reconstruction of Gasser’s approach see my article „Acquaintance, Anonym-
ity, Objectification“ (Malsch 1998b). The crucial point is that Gasser criticizes Hewitt’s prede-
fined open systems semantics (Gasser 1991) without realizing that he uses pre-defined semantics 
himself in MACE (Gasser et al. 1989), where acquaintance structures are „given“, while interme-
diate solutions are „emerging“ (from unsettled to settled issues) or „demerging“ (backwards from 
settled to unsettled issues) in the course of overall problem-solving.  
15
 A methodological comparison of at least two different sociological approaches is needed not only 
because we want to evaluate their respective technological performances but also because we 
need to control the point of „over-abstraction“: by cross-checking we can hopefully observe how 
and when the models abstracted from different sociological theories begin to converge and where 
they turn out identical. And if we arrive at a point of over-abstraction, where we could no longer 
distinguish between, for instance, social structure in Gidden’s or in Luhmann’s sense, or even 
worse, between structure and social structure, i.e. where the specific quality of a particular socio-
logical approach or of sociological theory in general is distorted or trivialized, we could ask our-
selves whether we have blundered. As we can see here, socionics is in need of a rather sophisti-
cated methodology, of a kind of methodological opportunism, or, to put it more indulgently, of a 
reflexive instrumentation which combines ethnography with experimental techniques. 
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ning systems) and compare them with one another, processes with processes and re-
sults with results. As far as the results are concerned new socionic benchmarks are 
needed which, like their well known canonical counterparts in DAI (Pursuit Game, 
Towers of Hanoi, RoboCup), can compare technical performance levels in competing 
solutions. Once again these few remarks are programmatic. They address the problem 
of building new metrics for measuring the technological impact of sociological concep-
tions, but they do not demonstrate how to do it. 
4.3.2 Testing the strong hypothesis of socionics by systematic comparison 
As far as the comparability of different translations as process is concerned, we must 
ensure that the sociological concepts chosen for experimental transformation are all 
transformed in the same way. This is where sociological „resistance“ must systemati-
cally come into play again. In order to guarantee a fair comparison between, say, two 
different sociological theories we must resist the temptation to trivialize or to reinter-
pret the underlying concepts or move away from the original ideas. To assess the tech-
nological (un)suitability or value of these two theories, the process of their translation 
or transformation into multiagent technology must be comparable, and comparability 
can only be guaranteed if the transformation process is patterned as closely as possible 
on the original sociological concepts. Insisting on fidelity with the initial sociological 
concept is not meant as a safeguard against the initial concept being violated or being 
“picked to pieces” like an old car wreck. The point is rather that resistance is imminent 
because it is the only way to methodologically control the process of translation and to 
guarantee a fair comparison between the resulting technology, and ultimately, the only 
way to „falsify“ the strong hypothesis of socionics.16 
On this basis we would not only find out what it means to read different sociological 
theories as technology. We could also, in comparing socionic with non-socionic solu-
tions to the problem of dynamic scalability, gather more evidence of what the strong 
hypothesis of socionics can and cannot deliver. Of course, at present nobody can say 
for sure that the proposed grounding in sociology will turn out to have less bearing on 
the possible future technological success of artificial sociality than expected. And of 
course, a plausible case can be made for the view that technological progress in artifi-
cial sociality is driven not so much by sociological orthodoxy as by the sheer pleasure 
socionicists find in playing with social metaphors and algorithmic principles from DAI, 
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 At this point of our experimental setting, sociological and computational claims („references“) 
appear to converge and it becomes crystal clear that a sociologist who wishes to work as an engi-
neer must remain a fully fledged professional sociologist to do a professional job in DAI-
engineering. There is no need for complicated maneuvers and fantastic inventions like an „engi-
neer-sociologist“ (Callon 1987). Instead of confusing industrial innovation with sociological theo-
rizing, we should be very precise in what we are talking about. And in order to observe how new 
socionic practices are established by alternation or “boundary crossing” between sociology and 
DAI, we need to draw a clear distinction between the two faculties, not by presupposing an onto-
logical hiatus between society and technology, but in the sense of different epistemic practices 
and arenas.  
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juggling with the conceptual foundations of sociology, picking them to pieces and re-
combining them with multiagent technology. Innovation in socionics, then, should be 
seen as an inventive process, a spontaneous “migration of social metaphors” (Malsch 
et al. 1996) rather than a planned transfer of concepts under the governance of sociol-
ogy. From a broader perspective, however, planned transfer and spontaneous invention 
are two sides of the same coin. Even if sociologists cooperating with DAI adhere to 
the maxim of resistance against trivialization and conformity with the initial sociologi-
cal concept, they still are involved in a translation process that is more akin to rework-
ing than transferring their initial theoretical concepts. It is a process vitalized by the 
contradictive claims of sociologists striving to gain authentic sociological knowledge 
in tandem with computer scientists focussed on technological innovation. 
4.3.3 Boundary crossing: observing the inventive process 
What is needed are transdisciplinary research projects that allow to alternate method-
ologically between the claims and perspectives of sociology and DAI and to observe 
how new epistemic practices are established by alternation or “boundary crossing” 
between the two disciplines. Such projects must endow both sociologists and computer 
scientists with a joint responsibility; they must also allow for built-in conflict of disci-
plinary goals by providing frequent job rotation in order to prevent escalating conflicts 
and deadlocks. Socionic projects will only yield positive results and allow for creative 
processing if pains are taken to keep the boundaries between DAI and sociology 
clearly delineated so that protagonists are always sure on which side they are standing 
and when they are crossing over to the other side. And this is all the more important, 
because a demarcation line cannot be drawn and crossed by the same actor at the same 
time. It is impossible to observe how an unplanned migration of social metaphors oc-
curs while busily working on a planned transfer of sociological concepts. And it is im-
possible to strive for sociological authenticity whilst screening sociological theories for 
a technologically suitable idea. Nonetheless, these are precisely the situations socionic 
projects are going to find themselves in and it can be easily predicted that they are go-
ing to have a great deal of trouble and excitement. 
5. Praxis Reference: Artificial societies out of control? 
If it is correct that sociologically informed multiagent systems have an unspecified po-
tential of application, this is by no means to imply that this potential is also “unspe-
cific” with regard to its practical significance and its impact on society. To address this 
issue we must turn from “computational reference” to “praxis reference”, i.e. from the 
performance criteria of pure computation to the practical criteria of applied technology 
and ecological validity or viability.17 Here, the focus is on the risks and chances of ap-
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 Referring to contingent strategies or possible projects, „viability“ is more appropriate than the 
current, but misleading term „validity“ which refers to an objective, given world of things. Admit-
tedly, there are borderline phenomena juxtaposed between „computation“ and „praxis“. An out-
standing example is resource management in internet-supported distributed computing: „Resource 
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plied artificial social systems in a democratic society. Indeed, to inquire into the prac-
tical significance of artificial sociality is to open the door on a highly contentious field 
of praxis: How can we imagine peaceful coexistence with an artificial society of tech-
nical agents able to act autonomously and socially competent just like human beings? 
Do we have to prepare for the advent of hybrid communities of artificial and human 
“agents” (Parunak 1996, Steiner 1996) that force us to a fundamental rethinking of the 
relationship between humanity and technology? 
5.1 The crucial issue is not the human-machine distinction but the dif-
ference between AI’s monoagents and DAI’s multiagent systems 
Such questions are not without precedent. In an impassioned defense of the uniqueness 
of human intelligence against usurpation by the “computational metaphor of mind”, 
Hubert Dreyfus had already raised similar issues (Dreyfus 1979). However, despite the 
fact that Dreyfus was the moral winner of the subsequent philosophical controversy on 
machine intelligence, it can still be said that the computational metaphor of mind is “an 
extremely influential notion” (Nolan 1992) that has lost none of its purchase in AI. 
When sociologists joined the debate on AI it soon became apparent that there was a 
great deal of disagreement among them as to the nature of the distinction between 
(wo)man and computer. Some sociologists insisted on the social distinction of human 
agenthood (Collins 1990, Wolfe 1991) whilst others rubbed their hands with glee at 
the thought of radically deconstructing the human-machine opposition (Woolgar 1985, 
Schwartz 1989). Yet others tried to take the sting out of those “scenarios of gloom”, in 
which our society is allegedly transformed into a giant computer, and began to investi-
gate how intelligent interfaces, expert systems and translation programs were practi-
cally used and socially embedded. Their work provided a useful empirical corrective to 
the high flying claims of AI (Suchman 1987, Hatchuel/Weil 1990, Malsch et al. 1993, 
Malsch et al. 1998, Rammert et al. 1998).  
Even so, it is interesting to note that, in the light of the challenges thrown down by 
AI, none of the company have quite succeeded in formulating and establishing an in-
dependent sociological view of the problem. None of them had any better idea than to 
take up the given lines of battle drawn by Dreyfus and Searle, Weizenbaum and Wi-
nograd. With hindsight we can say the reason for this failure is that they were unable 
to see the sociological impact of the fundamental distinction between classic AI’s 
“monoagent” systems and DAI’s multiagent systems (Malsch 1997: 4). Insofar socio-
nics is not interested in agent modelling and architecture as such. It is rather interested 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
allocation in multi-agent systems is a problem that raises issues of reciprocity as well as perform-
ance and security concerns. Nodes on the world-wide web, for instance, may be willing to be part 
of the multi-agent system if they receive something in return for allowing foreign agents to use 
their resources. From the performance and security perspective, agents migrating to a node may 
exhibit undesirable resource consumptive behaviors, either individually or as ensembles. Similarly, 
network channels are a scarce resource requiring controls on how they may be used.“ (Ja-
mali/Thati/Agha 1998)  
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in modelling the interplay between agents and multiagent archtitecture. Hence, from 
the standpoint of socionics, the task at hand is to jumble the old lines of battle around 
the hegemonic power of the computational metaphor of the singular mind, and to break 
the hold of the gloom and doom scenarios of an inhuman society modeled on techno-
logy.  
5.2 Yet another paradox: designing technology according to non-
technological principles  
In this sense what we need to do is to construct technology that is modeled on society. 
Here we touch again on the issue of transforming sociological concepts into innovati-
ons in computer science, this time, however, from a quite different perspective where 
we find ourselves, a bit like Alice in Wonderland, confronted with yet another curious 
paradox. How can we even think of designing a technology according to principles 
which, by their own inner nature, are of a-technological quality? Technology may be 
viewed as a fully controlled structure of means and ends, skillfully set to work as a 
cleverly devised, deterministic apparatus. Society, however, presents itself as an un-
controllable, and thus a-technical phenomenon, which, in spite of (or because of) inten-
tional planning and steering activities, we (who?) cannot really grasp in the same way 
as we can control a technology “because somewhere something is getting in the way 
with counter-steering activities“ (Luhmann 1986: 203, my translation, ThM). Hence, 
any attempt to seriously think an artificial society modeled on real society must be di-
savowed because, judged by the standards of a technology under control, it would ine-
vitably end up either in something useless or something dangerous.  
To make ourselves more familiar with the paradoxical idea of an a-technical tech-
nology, we should remember that technology as a social project can only get out of 
control because society itself is uncontrollable. This is certainly neither a reason to be 
fatalistic nor to be optimistic; it is rather an opportunity to rethink, and possibly re-
value, the meaning of “uncontrollability” in a socio-technical context (Malsch 1999). 
As far as AI is concerned, it always took particular pride in the fact that there was no 
way of determining in advance how intelligent programs would react when faced with 
a concrete problem – or at what concrete solution they would arrive. This was valid at 
the time for expert systems and is even more valid now for neuronal nets. We might 
know and program the principles that make these systems function and we might equip 
them with a particular operational goal such as pattern recognition. But within this pre-
determined framework they operate in a non-determinist and, in principle, unpredict-
able manner. AI rhetoric sometimes plays down the instrumentality and transparency 
of its artifacts whilst taking particular pleasure in highlighting the “mysterious” non-
transparency of neuronal nets running on a non-deterministic operational level (Malsch 
1992: 164). If we subtract the rhetoric, however, we are still left with a notable differ-
ence to “inscrutable” large technological systems such as an airbus or an atomic power 
station: such large systems are supposed to operate in a deterministic manner. And it is 
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not in spite of - but precisely because of - their deterministic operating mode that they 
can run out of control.  
5.3 From disobedient avatars... 
However, agent technology and multiagent systems do force “uncontrollability” further 
down the line of non-deterministic operational modes. The autonomy of action granted 
these artifacts implies that agents might possibly do, as the Anglican Prayer Book has 
it, “those things which they ought not to have done”. The so-called “avatars” and “as-
sistant agents” are an important step in this direction even if they were originally con-
ceived as out and out ministering angels. Intelligent technologies which possess social 
as well as cognitive skills, they are able to “empathize” themselves into the role of the 
user (Braun 1998: 192).18 They have also raised hopes that the adaptivity and flexibil-
ity of multiagent systems will be substantially increased when users and software 
agents are able to directly communicate with, and learn from, one another as interac-
tion partners. A vital prerequisite for this is that both human users and technical agents 
„perceive“ one another as social actors. Research work in this direction orients itself 
on the vision of a hybrid community of humans and artificial agents that “do not dis-
tinguish between interactions with humans and interactions with artificial agents” (Pa-
runak 1996: 150). This appears to be leading to a qualitatively new form of embedding 
technology into the social context of its practical application.19  
An assistant agent which presorts its user’s electronic mail or arranges appointments 
is not so much a technical tool which processes instructions as a decision-maker which 
uses its own judgements to facilitate the daily routine of its user and yet at the same 
time follows its own priorities and interferes in the user’s affairs. We may suppose that 
assistant agents will only be equipped with such decision-making powers when they 
behave towards their user in the same way as a personal secretary with whose compe-
tencies they are inscribed. This opens new perspectives for reciprocal dynamic 
adaptability which will allow far greater account to be taken of users’ wishes than has 
been possible so far with the human-machine interface (Lenzmann/Wachsmuth 1997). 
But what would happen if the „assistent“ began to turn against its master or if the 
“autonomous personal representative” of a higher ranking person appeared in a posi-
tion of strength before a person of lower rank and made use of its superior resources of 
power? What impact would this have on social relations and under what conditions 
would the user of the future be prepared to accept it?  
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 Quoting Pickering that „we humans differ from non-humans precisely in that our actions have 
intentions behind them“ (Pickering 1993: 565), Braun (1998: 170) cannot resist the temptation to 
ask what exactly to do with the difference of „having intentions“ if machines would be pro-
grammed with intentionality as in the case of agents endowed with a so-called BDI (belief, desire, 
intention)-architecture?  
19
 To evaluate multiagent systems in hybrid settings see Star’s (1989) suggestion of what she called 
the „Durkheim Test“. 
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These are questions concerning multiagent systems under „real world“ conditions, 
and they must be answered to meet the requirements of practical application: feasibil-
ity and usability, acceptability and profitability, security and sustainability. Today, 
agent societies are still far from meeting these criteria nor will they do so unless we 
seriously begin to address the deep questions concerning the insertion of social agents 
in the context of human sociality. To evaluate the chances and risks of hybrid commu-
nities we have to analyze how the interpenetration or amalgamation of human and 
technical actors may be resolved in accordance with the values of a democratic soci-
ety. Here, it is not enough to mobilize the means and methods of conventional technol-
ogy assessment because the case of artificial societies confronts us with an unconven-
tional challenge. For here we are having to deal not merely with the usual questions 
regarding the implantation of a deterministic technology in a non-deterministic context 
characterized by interaction relationships between social actors. We are rather faced 
with the paradox of a presumptive technology which, like its social context of applica-
tion, is composed of non-deterministic or contingent “social relations”. 
The homologous nature of agent technology and human society complicates rather 
than simplifies matters. This applies particularly to issues of the credibility and accep-
tance of assistant agents by their human co-players and opponents. Assistant agents 
will first have to win this approval by showing they are capable of appropriate social 
behavior in particular situations of human interaction. They will have to exhibit a be-
havior that meets the demands of our shared cultural practices, even when the field of 
action is restricted to the narrow subset of delegated tasks. Even then agents will not 
be allowed to follow a predetermined path because social situations are characterized 
by intersecting rationales of action which must be resolved in an acceptable way. To 
be accepted as co-partners, assistant agents must learn that our decision-making is sel-
dom oriented on unambiguous preference orders. And, for our part, we shall have to 
learn that an autonomous personal representative on occasions is just as capable of 
independent (re)action as its owner. It is within this charged area that the possibilities 
and limits of socially acceptable artificial agents must be researched and evaluated 
(Schulz-Schaeffer 1998).  
5.4 ...to new dimensions of uncontrollability 
However, the question of a non-deterministic technology composed of contingent “so-
cial relations” has another, and clearly portentous, dimension. This should be apparent 
if we think for a moment of what lies, or could lie, beyond the human-machine inter-
face and what is not visible on the screen. Beyond the interface there is not just one 
single personal assistant acting on orders, which must be watched over and controlled 
like a tiny golem because it is equipped with certain autonomous decision-making 
powers. The assistant agent is rather meshed in a network of a vast number of other 
agents which as “avatars” are representing other humans or perhaps – and this is the 
crux of the matter – are not representing any real person at all, not acting on anyone’s 
orders, but fulfilling some other useful or reproductive function for the agent network 
in order to keep it going. In other words, they are acting on behalf of the agent society 
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and not on behalf of any human user. They represent the agent society itself by work-
ing for its self-sufficiency or autarchy, and they are acting independently of – and in 
some cases even in direct opposition to – the interests and wishes of human users. It is 
from this perspective that the autopoietic reproduction of an artificial society needs to 
be dealt with in a critical yet open and unbiased manner.  
Indeed the peculiar feature of this kind of artificial society lies precisely in the fact 
that it is as little at the command of our wills as “our” real society is. Whilst an uncon-
trollable assistant agent would be a deficient construction, quite the reverse holds true 
for an uncontrollable society of agents: trying to build artificial societies on the model 
of human societies means mobilizing the technological potential of an essentially non-
technological modus of social reproduction which can no longer be manipulated “from 
the outside” – in other words by designers, users and owners. Even if an artificial soci-
ety were composed exclusively of „personal assistants“ - i.e. without any additional 
internal agents acting on behalf of its autarchy - and even if all these personal assistant 
agents were endowed with as little autonomy as possible, each of them working to the 
strict orders of their human owner „outside“, it would still be impossible, for system-
atic reasons, to command and control the agent society as a whole - just as modern 
society, although composed of nothing less than our own self-ordained actions, lies 
beyond the sphere of our control. Only when we have come to terms with the idea that 
autonomous artificial societies can be something quite different from the industrious 
little dwarves of our fairy tales (Rammert 1998) or the ravaging Internet agent bands of 
our nightmares, will we be free to pursue the paradoxical question of an a-technical 
technology in all its radical creativity.  
6. Towards a triangular research program 
In order to make progress in socionics, we must clearly distinguish between the three 
different perspectives it offers and mesh them in a triangular research program: model-
ing sociological theories in the medium of multiagent technology (“sociological refer-
ence”); reading sociological theories as instructions how to build innovative multiagent 
systems („computational reference“); and designing hybrid societies of artificial agents 
and human actors in accordance with social sustainabilty, democratic values and eco-
nomic efficiency („praxis reference“). The issue at stake here is whether socionic re-
search can help to bridge the growing gap between hardware potentials and software 
applications and supply the coming generation of massive parallel computing with 
complex „social“ networks sustained by a host of smart mini algorithms. Even though 
we do not have to begin from zero, and even though the borderland between sociology 
and DAI is no longer an unexplored terra incognita as it was a few years ago, we are 
still very much in the dark as to what exactly will happen when sociological models 
are translated into the language of DAI and as to the possible benefits or drawbacks of 
sociological theorizing inspired by DAI. And we still know far too little about inserting 
sociological theories into the inventive process of building dynamic large-scale multi-
agent systems.  
                     
31
In order to address these issues in a way beneficial for both communities, computer 
science and sociology alike, we will need patience and stamina. When we break into 
research territory outside the confines of our well established knowledge domains, we 
cannot tell in advance what exactly is going to happen nor insure ourselves against 
possible set-backs. We cannot know at present what DAI and sociology will really 
learn from one another nor how they will learn it. Equally, we cannot know all the im-
plications of developing an intelligent computer technology that takes social systems 
as its model. In spite of all the many unanswered questions, however, we may take 
heart for our expeditions in the socionic borderland from the precedent of classic AI. 
As we know today, the famous Dartmouth Conference of 1958 which inaugurated AI 
research, triggered off a paradigm revolution in the computer sciences. Forty years 
ago, when AI was a newcomer to computer sciences, its implications were not very 
clear and it had to contend with opposition from traditional computer science branches. 
We should keep this in mind as we strike out into a research field that not so long ago 
was still considered “The Unnamable”.  
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